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Abstract
Without extending the historical analysis, this article analyzes the relationship 
between the legal concept of person with regard to the notion of living indepen-
dently. The concept is normatively established in Article 19 of the CRPD and is 
presented as a legal fiction. The legal technique of fictio iuris is the premise for ana-
lyzing contemporary problems, for example, the attribution of responsibilities to 
non-human personalities, such as robots. The article, however, develops the prob-
lem of attributing rights to persons with disabilities. The contraposition of robots 
and disabled people, understood as opposing visions of anthropological and human 
models, is part of the philosophical dispute between humanism and post- or transhu-
manism. The conception of man appears different if created in the image and like-
ness of God, or as the fruit of evolution from primates, or as a transhumanist entity 
that can be replaced by the robot. The latter vision is rooted in the mechanization 
of the mind triggered by cybernetics and cognitive sciences and referable to prob-
lems of justice theory and political philosophy concerning the inclusion in society 
of disabled people. In this article I will limit myself to analyzing, against the back-
ground of this complex problem, the link between person, legal fiction and the right 
to disability starting from the criticism addressed by Nussbaum to Rawls based on 
the convention and following the methodology developed by Marchisio and Curto in 
order to clarify the legal connection between thirdness, disability, and person.
However, I go one step further by including the issue of disability as justice within 
the evolution of the notion of the legal person, through the inclusion of fictio iuris 
and rhetorical methodology in positive law, as a criterion for the interpretation of 
art. 19 CRPD.
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Without extending the historical analysis, this article analyzes the relationship 
between the legal concept of person with to the notion of independently living. The 
concept is normatively established in Article 19 of the 2006 UN Convention on the 
Rights of Person with Disabilities (CRPD) and is presented as alegal fiction. The 
legal technique of fictio iuris is the premise for analyzing contemporary problems, 
for example, the attribution of responsibilities to non-human personalities, such as 
robots. The article, however, develops the problem of attributing rights to persons 
with disabilities. The contraposition of robots and disabled people, understood as 
opposing visions of anthropological and human models, is part of the philosophi-
cal dispute between humanism and post- or transhumanism. The conception of man 
appears different if created in the image and likeness of God [27], or as the fruit of 
evolution from primates [50], or as a transhumanist entity that can be replaced by 
the robot [11, 30, 31]. The latter vision is rooted in the mechanization of the mind 
triggered by cybernetics and cognitive sciences and referable to problems of justice 
theory and political philosophy concerning the inclusion in the society of disabled 
people [12, 13, 60]. In the article I will limit myself to analyzing, against the back-
ground of this complex problem, the link between person, legal fiction and the right 
to disability starting from the criticism addressed by Nussbaum to Rawls based on 
the convention and following the methodology developed by Marchisio and Curto 
[14, 41, 71] in order to clarify the legal connection between thirdness, disability, and 
person.
However, I go one step further by including the issue of disability as justice 
within the evolution of the notion of the legal person, through the inclusion of fictio 
iuris and rhetorical methodology in positive law, as a criterion for the interpretation 
of art. 19 CRPD.
2  Legal Fiction and Legal Entity: A Brief Summary
Roman law did not develop a concept of the legal person, as I understand it today. 
The natural person is in fact the center of the legal experience, as the Digest speci-
fies.1 While the distinction between person and collective association or collectivity 
of goods remains clear, it is nevertheless a distinction that will serve to elaborate on 
the concept later.2
The origins of the notion of legal person go back to the Roman notion of fictio 
iuris, as later developed in medieval canon law. As Thomas recently pointed out, 
legal fiction [fictio iuris or legis] is a procedure belonging to juridical pragmatics 
which consists in the first place in disguising facts, in declaring them other than 
what they are, and in drawing from this same adulteration the juridical consequences 
that would be referred to the truth which is pretended [70].
1 “Totum ius hominunm causa costitutum est”, D.1.5.2..
2 Ulpianus, [67] 4.2.9.1, 12.
1 3
Person and Disability: Legal Fiction and Living Independently 
The fictio iuris is a precise technique dating back to Roman law and subsequently 
elaborated by Medieval Canon law, which p. Positivist juridical modernity has dis-
carded the fictio iuris, which is proposed again today [9, 24, 70]. This short histori-
cal reflection is only intended to show the connection between the notion of legal 
person and the use of the fictio iuris technique. It raises, however, a current problem 
for legal theory: whether legal fiction represents exclusively a technical means that 
the law is free to get rid of through an effort of purification or whether it is constitu-
tively inherent in the logic of juridical experience [71, p. 5] and in particular in the 
concept of the person [53].
This historical evolution proposes a possible re-evaluation of the fictio technique 
in the legal sphere, following the crisis of legal positivism, the hierarchical model of 
the legal system [23, p.18] and the appearance of new profiles of non-human sub-
jectivity [11, 27, 31]. In the article I intend to analyze how the issue also concerns 
the notion of independently living for the disabled person, in particular in the light 
of Art. 19 CRPD on the theme of justice and social bond [52].
The historical origin of the fictio technique in Roman law is sacrificial: with 
the emergence of the magical-sacral ambit of ius pontificium there was a gradual 
replacement of human sacrifices with animal sacrifices, and then with fictitious sac-
rifices of objects of lesser value, where instead of the real animal a clay or wax 
simulacrum was sacrificed. In this symbolic substitution would reside the religious 
foundation of fictio, which gave rise to a subsequent “secular” use of this technique 
by the legislator, as well as by the Roman praetor. The topic can be developed with 
the theme of the gift [1, 22, 46] and the sacred origins of law.
There are numerous and well-known examples of the use of fictio in Roman law 
such as the fictio legis Corneliae [about 81 BC]. The citizen who died in captivity 
[in hostium potestate] was considered to have died free: because if he had fallen 
into the hands of the enemy, he would otherwise have become, under Roman law, 
his property, losing libertas and civitas [freedom and citizenship]. The lex Cornelia 
reversed this perspective, in order to safeguard the testamentary succession of the 
prisoner, through the fiction of the death of the prisoner as a free citizen in Rome. 
Techniques of this kind, therefore, provide an example of how the “legal reality” can 
be built through the negation of “historical reality”, for the realization of a specific 
“goal” of an equitable nature [72, p. 21].
Important figures in this evolution were also the formulae ficticiae of the Roman 
praetor and the figure of hereditas iacens. [24, 53].
Roman law never elaborated a real conceptual and theoretical definition of fictio, 
nevertheless, this concept was relevant for the subsequent legal construction of a 
fictional reality having effects on natural reality.
It was, in fact, Medieval and Canon law that developed the notion of the legal 
person, through a tradition rooted in the notion of St. Paul of the Church as corpus 
mysticum [33] and as an antechamber of the modern notion of State [4, 21, 38, 39, 
50, 58].
Medieval law, in fact, substantially changed the overall picture in which the fic-
tio was inserted. The rebirth of the Justinian law of Corpus Iuris Civilis and the 
affirmation of Roman law as the law in force became the salient fact of a period 
which, with ups and downs, ran from the beginning of the eleventh century until the 
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“age of codifications”, on the threshold of the nineteenth century. The use of the fic-
tio underwent, with the Glossator of Irnerius’ Bologna School, a profound change. 
From the Romans’ simple casuistic use, an attempt to systematize its essence began, 
arguing, distinguishing, deducing. The fictio wass placed theoretically in a broader 
context, already steeped in ontological concerns, to the point of arriving at a theory 
in which the fictitious or intellectual persons developed by the jurists could not eas-
ily be distinguished from the universals that the nominalists used to call fictiones 
intellectuales.
Although, in fact, the nature of universitas as distinct from its constituent parts 
still eluded the Glossators, it was the Decretists, following the work of Gratian and 
the process of reorganization of the Church by Gregory VII, who began to consider 
the Church as a bride, reasoning “as if” it were in fact a bride: therefore, applying to 
it rules relating to physical persons [72, p. 89].
The theoretical recourse to fictio can be observed in the Glossators in the idea of 
the thing judged as a legal fiction of truth (taking up the Ulpian’s well-known adage 
“res iudicata pro veritate accipitur”). However, it is in the formation of the concept 
of the person that the use of fictio opens explicitly for the first time to new, unpre-
dictable developments, up to the formalization of Sinibaldo de’ Fieschi (Pope Inno-
cent IV) and his theory of the ‘persona ficta’, aimed at signifying how the adjective 
has a value that emphasizes the artifice, but in a positive sense, the creative dimen-
sion of the construction of a world through abstract figurations incidental to reality 
[21, p. 221].
I hypothesize that the concept of disabled person living independently  can be 
interpreted in this way, as a notion in part fictional, but referable to a possible non-
exclusive world of the disabled person, configuring a ‘new right of the person’, 
based on the inclusion of disability in the theory of law starting from the theories of 
the social bond of Sequeri [69], Nussbaum [51] and Heritier [26].
Without any pretension of historical continuity, the problem of finality is, in fact, 
not absent in modern legal theory, which is divided into Savigny’s [64] and Puchta’s 
[59] fictionalist theories and von Gierke’s [19] realistic theories, but at the same 
time certifies a mentality opposite to the medieval one [14, p. 26, 64, p. 205]. If for 
the Medieval, the fiction derived from the recognition of an already existing de facto 
situation, for the modernity, the State has the task of introducing, through fiction, 
new collective legal categories [54, 14, pp. 26, 27]. Kelsen’s normativism, then, in 
juxtaposing legal science and natural science, considers the norm as the mere center 
of attribution of rights and duties to subjects based on rules laid down by the legal 
system [34]. Apparently, Kelsen overcomes the finality of positive law by basing it 
on logic and science; in reality, he reopens the debate on the fictional foundation of 
law [24, 25].
3  Disability as a Matter of Justice After Rawls and Nussbaum
Following the publication of Martha Nussbaum’s book on the subject [51] and the 
almost contemporary drafting of the 2006 CRPD, the contemporary debate has per-
ceived disability as a central issue of reflection on justice. How administrations, 
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businesses, judges, states, all citizens consider and treat disabled people poses fun-
damental problems of justice. In Italy, beyond the declarations of principle, in the 
courts, hospitals, schools, businesses, homes, and health centers, there are still many 
prejudices and conceptions that are irreconcilable with the theoretical approach of 
the CRPD.
On the one hand, disability emerges as a matter of theoretical interest for the phi-
losophy of justice; on the other hand, it can become a useful tool to reflect on the 
notion of legal person, as it emerges from the history of the concept. Disability can-
not be considered as a fixed and definable reality once and for all, but must be con-
sidered a constantly changing phenomenon within the system from which the defini-
tion of the notion of person emerges. Even the notion of legal person is, in fact, the 
result of a complex and always evolving historical evolution.
In Nussbaum’s text, in fact, the problem of disability is linked to a fundamental 
critique of the most relevant contribution to the problem of justice in the last fifty 
years: the Rawlsian model of the ‘veil of ignorance’ as an attempt to establish a 
theory of justice as equity. Her words sound clear: “… Rawls omits from the situa-
tion of basic political choice the more extreme forms of need and dependency that 
human beings may experience, both physical and mental, both permanent and tem-
porary. This is no oversight: it is deliberate design. As I shall see, Rawls recognizes 
the problem posed by the inclusion of citizens with unusual impairments, but he 
argues that this problem should be solved at a later stage, after basic political princi-
ples are already chosen” [51, p. 108].
The reason Rawls does not include the disabled person at the moment of the fic-
tion of the founding social contract is, fundamentally, the adoption of a still tradi-
tional conception of contractualism. According to Rawls, the reasons for depart-
ing from the state of nature are to reap benefit from cooperation; a very traditional 
economic vision defines the benefits [51, p. 118]. By including the disabled, in his 
model, he would lose “a simple and straightforward way of measuring who is the 
least well-off in society” [51, p. 113]. This loss has severe consequences on the 
profile of mutual benefit in cases of rare or severe disability situations, where the 
measures taken cannot be defended with economic but moral arguments. Nussbaum, 
then, relying on Sen’s economic doctrine, develops a list of the capacity that presup-
poses the adoption of a moral and not an economic argument. A more comprehen-
sive view of the human underlies her position, capable of allowing some form of 
measurement useful for the adoption of public policies. At the same time, Nussbaum 
is perfectly aware of the temporariness and modifiability of this list of capabilities, 
not to be confused with a sort of new natural right [if conceived as fixed and stable]. 
She explicitly states about the capacity threshold of each citizen, “The approach as 
set forth in my philosophical account specifies this threshold only in a general and 
approximate way, both because I hold that the threshold level may shift in subtle 
ways over time, and because I hold that the appropriate threshold level of a capabil-
ity may, at the margins, be differently set by different societies in accordance with 
their histories and circumstances” [51, p. 180].
The thesis I intend to argue is that these theoretical positions are also reveal that 
the evolution of the concept of a legal person has never really taken the issue of dis-
ability into account. I do not intend, however, to develop in this article an analysis 
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of the other contexts in which Nussbaum addresses the notion of person, in particu-
lar, gender studies, but also immigration and the frontier between what is an animal 
and what is a man. I only indicate the link between disability, justice, and notion of 
person.
The theme of art. 19 CRPD is linked to this approach on disability, which analy-
ses the theme of living independently as a frontier not only for justice, but also for 
the concept of human beings. Without being able to analyze here the perspective 
of the capabilities, I could advance some embryonic considerations. For Nussbaum, 
such an approach is a kind of legal approach, one of the human rights, a political 
doctrine concerning a humanistic way of conceiving fundamental rights and not 
only a moral theory based on values [51, p. 159]. It takes into account the need for 
an individualized care based on an Aristotelian, and not Kantian, conception of dig-
nity, which recognizes the evolution over a lifetime of dependence on others [first as 
children, and differently in the third age], requiring, however, some list of abilities 
although modifiable [‘tentative and open’] [51, p. 166].
4  A Methodology for Independently Living
In the Italian context, the primary methodology concerning the implementation of 
Article 19 of the UN Convention3 has been developed by the ‘Centro DIVI’ [in Ital-
ian  Diritti e vita indipendente, English  translation  Rights and Independently Liv-
ing] Centre. The researchers Cecilia Marchisio and Natascia Curto, have developed 
a methodology to implement ‘living independently’ (Art. 19 CRPD). In Italy, the 
theme of inclusion in society and the closure of treatment centers has been studied 
starting from Basaglia’s work, the psychiatrist creator of the theoretical and legisla-
tive process that led to the closure of asylums [16, 66]. Marchisio and Curto devel-
oped the methodology of Open Dialogues and Anticipation Dialogues by Jakko 
Seikkula [65, 66]. It consists of the construction of a transformative dialogue situ-
ated within a social network, based on the intuitions of Bakhtin and Bateson [41, p. 
56, 5, 6, 18]. In the elaboration of the shared meaning built through dialogue, “the 
meaning does not pre-exist, but is generated by the succession of the interventions of 
the different actors in the dialogue” [41, p. 57]. According to Marchisio, “the main 
consequence of this way of understanding the discourse in the psychosocial field is a 
different distribution of power between operator and person who comes into contact 
3 Article 19 [Living Independently and being included in the community]. States Parties to the pre-
sent Convention recognize the equal right of all persons with disabilities to live in the community, with 
choices equal to others, and shall take effective and appropriate measures to facilitate full enjoyment by 
persons with disabilities of this right and their full inclusion and participation in the community, includ-
ing by ensuring that: [a] Persons with disabilities have the opportunity to choose their place of residence 
and where and with whom they live on an equal basis with others and are not obliged to live in a particu-
lar living arrangement; [b] Persons with disabilities have access to a range of in-home, residential and 
other community support services, including personal assistance necessary to support living and inclu-
sion in the community, and to prevent isolation or segregation from the community; [c] Community ser-
vices and facilities for the general population are available on an equal basis to persons with disabilities 
and are responsive to their needs.
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with the [public] service to be supported” [41, p. 58]. In this perspective, it is crucial 
to consider the point of view of the disabled person: “everyone is free to take the 
difficulties they encounter in the project, or, indeed, their concerns about obstacles 
and risks of the path” [41, p. 83]. A simple example can make the point clear: if a 
report states that: ‘F. does not want to go to the internship anymore; his mother says 
that it is because he is tired this week’ I am presenting two opinions putting them on 
different levels. The operator’s opinion [i.e., that F. does not want to go any more] is 
presented as fact, while the mother’s opinion [i.e., that F. is tired] is inside the frame 
of the opinion. It would be correct—and more dialogical—to present both sentences 
as opinions: “According to the operator F. says that he does not want to go to the 
internship anymore, according to his mother, he is tired” [41, p. 57].
The author clarifies not by chance how the point is also taken from Barthes’ rhe-
torical perspective [41, p.57]. The Bakhtinian presence of polyphony of voices in 
dialogue and the construction of shared meaning leads to the formation of a poly-
phonic society of people and personality. The rhetoric methodology is relevant also 
for disability law’s approach.
This rhetorical reference to the construction of discourse represents the proper 
method for the application of legal norms, with particular reference to the right to 
disability. It is a useful way to go beyond the traditional way of interpreting disabil-
ity legislation, which refers to a theory of legal-positivistic interpretation.
While  the particularity of the text of the CRPD is the ‘dynamic’ character of the 
notion of disability, the rhetorical method seems useful to grasp this evolutionary 
and contingent trait, that is to say, linked to the specific case. The traditional positiv-
ist interpretation of the norms is, instead, aimed at reasoning in general and abstract 
terms. This paper will develop the two methodological aspects, starting with dis-
ability in this paragraph, and, in the next paragraph, briefly outlining the rhetorical 
methodology.
Disability is a mobile and dynamic situation, susceptible to evolution and always 
referred to the relational and social context in which it is embedded. The CRPD pre-
amble recognizes how “disability is an evolving concept and that disability results 
from the interaction between persons with impairments and attitudinal and environ-
mental barriers that hinders their full and effective participation in society on an 
equal basis with others”. Article 1 reiterates the concept, specifying how the pur-
pose of the Convention is “to promote, protect and ensure the full and equal enjoy-
ment of all human rights and fundamental freedoms by all persons with disabilities, 
and to promote respect for their inherent dignity”. In the second paragraph, it states, 
referring again to the social and relational dimension of barriers “persons with dis-
abilities include those who have long-term physical, mental, intellectual or sensory 
impairments which in interaction with various barriers may hinder their full and 
effective participation in society on an equal basis with others” [8, 15].
The methodological value of this definition indicates, for the theory of law, that 
the convention refers to an evolving historical definition, in which the barrier pre-
venting the inclusion of the disabled person in society is not static, but to be under-
stood dynamically and according to a relentless historical evolution. While the point 
appears to be adequately developed by the approach of living  independently, the 
implications for legal thought seem to me still unclear [3].
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The relevant legal conception of person, according to the complex legal process 
of recognition of the right to live independently in Italian law, shows how this right 
and, in general, the implementation of the rights recognized in the CRPD implies a 
shift in the interpretation and implementation of legal rules and the notion of legal 
person.
I hypothesize that the notion of living independently is the topic where the pro-
cess of re-articulation of inclusion, and therefore also of the legal notion of per-
son, can find its propulsive center, within the opposition between two models of the 
human being today in opposition: the man-machine and the man-disabled. In other 
articles I have indicated how the fictional representation of the concept of person is 
to be understood in a historical development that moves from the definition of the 
human in relation to the representation of a specular Other, first and until modernity 
in relation to the divine; then to the animal following the emergence of the evo-
lutionary paradigm; finally, at the time of the emergence of posthuman and tran-
shumanist perspectives, in relation to the image of the robot [27, 31]. These two 
conceptions also represent two different competing evolutions of the legal notion of 
person. The first one, however, does not seem to take into account the demands of 
social justice highlighted by Nussbaum’s criticism of Rawls, denying the vulnerabil-
ity inherent in the human condition, which the second one instead shows with evi-
dence. This point does not mean that every man is disabled but that the perspective 
of aging that everyone faces brings them closer to the condition of the person with 
disabilities, distancing them from the model of technological immortality promised 
by the religious use of new cyborg technologies [26]. The link between disability 
and the normal condition is part of the fictio juris elaboration technique [9]: we are 
all ‘as if’ we were disabled to build an inclusive society. This condition of ‘as if’ is 
relevant for both the concept of living independently and of  the legal person. The 
technique of elaborating on the legal notion of person entails the inclusion of the 
disabled person in the founding social contract [52, 60].
Seikkula and Marchisio and Curto’s methodology, in the simple example men-
tioned above, in fact, helps to clarify how the meaning emerges from the dialogue 
of all participants [the Bakhtinian polyphony of voices]. This approach seems to be 
entirely consistent with the rhetorical methodology applied to the context of the trial 
and, more generally, the whole process of disability law enforcement. The CRPD 
itself, first of all, in recognizing the situated and relational character of the defini-
tion of disability and inclusion, then in considering barriers as due to non-inclusive 
social practices, suggests, in my opinion, the adoption of a rhetorical methodology 
in the analysis of cases. The rhetorical methodology is a particular form of dialogue 
between the parties in the trial. It is a path of enforcement of rules concerning peo-
ple with disabilities, the meaning of which must emerge from dialogic practices 
involving those who apply them and those who are affected by their application. 
In other words, the interest of the configuration of the disability law as a unitary 
discipline appears not only to be directed to the application of the CPRD but also to 
the very theory of the interpretation of the law: the change in the view disability is 
viewed, in the reconfiguration of the legal concept of person, implies a change in 
the point of view to be adopted. Concerning the idea of living independently, the 
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interpreter must apply the law following a rhetorical methodology. In the next para-
graph, I will briefly analyze this problem.
5  Rhetorical Method, Severe Disability and Thirdness
The inclusion of the disabled person in a social context shows how no one can 
live independently and be sufficient unto himself: even the ‘living independently’ 
of each (supposedly able) person is necessarily limited.
So, the introduction of the problem of disability in the evolution of the resump-
tion of the use of the fictio iuris technique for the elaboration of the concept of 
person seems to provide an answer to two different convergent objectives. On the 
one hand, it allows us to deal with a difficulty typical of living independently 
where severe disabilities are concerned. A seriously disabled person can never 
be independent in the same sense as an able-bodied person. The ‘living indepen-
dently’ approach can, however, also be useful for persons with severe disabilities, 
inserting a perspective of evolution and empowerment even in very difficult con-
ditions of life. However, the legal technique of the fictio iuris will make it pos-
sible to include him/her in the concept of a person with full rights and genuine 
independent living (as if he/she were independent), making it possible to apply 
the same treatment to the severely disabled person as to any able-bodied per-
son and the slightly disabled person. This research perspective must, of course, 
be explored and coordinated with the existing positive law and disability legal 
studies, analyzed by an approach to unify disability studies and policy and legal 
aspects of empowerment [36, 42–45] However, it allows us to understand why 
the issue of disability is central to the evolution of the legal concept of person. 
It remains to be seen how the problem is linked to the adoption of a rhetorical 
method in the analysis of the legal case.
The topic of disability can be read not only from the perspective of ability. It 
could propose some measurement criterion that is effectively more comprehen-
sive than the economic-utilitarian one and is inspired by a humanistic conception 
of the person. It seems appropriate to search for such a criterion with the instru-
ments for evaluating justice proper to the legal culture according to a rhetorical 
method inspired by the Thirdness.
The theory of capacity for Nussbaum is a way of rethinking the human rights 
of the disabled person from the perspective of social inclusion. This interesting 
reversal of the  perspective configures the inclusion of ‘disabled’ as the oppo-
site of the human mechanization [11, 12] imposed by contemporary society. In 
a text dedicated to the concept of ‘disabled dignity’ [24] an idea was proposed, 
undoubtedly ambiguous, that disability is a state that everyone will experience at 
some point in their life, if it does not occur suddenly or at a young age. The con-
dition of disability is, therefore, a situation not to be only understood as ‘patho-
logical’, but paradoxically as  ‘normal’ for the human being, even if it is highly 
problematic and never desired. The language used  to speak about it should not 
only be expressed in terms of skills or abilities but starting from the idea that 
every able-bodied person can expect throughout his or her own life different 
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moments or periods of ‘disability’, at different levels. Capability and disability, 
dependence and independence, are conditions that can intersect throughout a per-
son’s life. It does not seem possible to think of oneself only as ‘able’, but as ‘pro-
visionally not-disabled’. The conditions in which every person may encounter the 
problem vary: it is impossible to conceive of the category as a whole. However, 
this transitional situation of disability can never be assimilated to those who are 
permanently disabled [26].
In this article, I go one step further by including the issue of disability as justice 
within the evolution of the notion of the legal person, through the inclusion of fictio 
iuris and rhetorical methodology in positive law, as a criterion for the interpretation 
of art. 19 CRPD.
So, the proposal that I would like to indicate is the adoption of a measurement 
criterion not based on an economic or utilitarian knowledge, but on a properly legal 
parameter, the notion of Thirdness. The framework following the CRPD mentioned 
above and the adoption of the resulting legislation and policies on disability can be 
indicated adequately through a simple observation, which concerns the very ambi-
guity of the legal effectiveness of human rights in the face of the primacy of eco-
nomics and utilitarianism in our societies, as already noted in Nussbaum’s criticism 
of Rawls’ concept. The process of implementing the contents of the UN Convention 
is undoubtedly not limited to their reception by national or supranational legisla-
tion, but to the complex task of putting into practice the anthropological vision that 
such legislation implies. Often such processes imply profound changes not only in 
the social representation of the concrete processes of “disabling”, but also how the 
law is conceived, interpreted, and applied. The Convention strongly affirms that the 
disadvantages experienced by people with disabilities are the product of social and 
environmental factors, interacting with individual impairments, placing barriers to 
full participation and inclusion in general. As Lawson and Priestley point out, the 
law can be part of the solution [enabling law] or part of the problem [disabling law] 
of disability, because “the discipline of law is a relatively recent newcomer to the 
multidisciplinary feast of disability studies” [37, p. 15]. Disability law needs a rheto-
ric methodology to be applied, focused on criticism of the syllogistic model in judi-
cial reasoning focused on criticism of the syllogistic model in judicial reasoning, to 
be replaced by a rhetorical methodology aimed at reconstructing the case topically 
[40, 56].
One of the biggest problems with disability law is precisely the lack of a uni-
fied approach as a discipline. Dispersed in different areas of the legal system, 
from civil law to administrative and labor law and criminal and tax law, the 
problem of disability law is that of its fragmentation. As noted by the judge 
Giorgio Latti, the risk is the lack of a discipline inspired by the unity of the 
person. The lack of coordination, therefore, that is often observed between the 
services with different profiles involved, in the life of a person with disabilities 
suggests “an activity of elaboration of the rules that inserts them in a homoge-
neous system, inspired by some fundamental principles” [36, p. 15]. The text 
of the Convention configures disability as a social relationship and bases the 
right to disability on the right to live independently and full inclusion. This pro-
cess, therefore, can be combined with an experience already well known in Italy, 
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the process of deinstitutionalization of asylums following the adoption of the 
Basaglia law in the 1980s [16, 41, 68]. The regulatory framework, the judges’ 
interpretation, and the practices of the public administrations involved in the 
enforcement of the CRPD, still seem to be inspired by a vision in which the 
rights incorporated in national legislation represent little more than a legally due 
option, but in reality not feasible, in the light of the economic crisis and the 
significant public debt, or merely an outdated vision of the phenomenon of ‘dis-
ability’. As Marchisio and Curto effectively point out, “it is as if the law plan is 
fading as it approaches practices, making full citizenship for people with dis-
abilities an option of which technicians can assess the opportunity” [7, p. 157].
In the light of this situation, I can see how useful it would be to form a 
class of legal practitioners sensitive to the new jurisprudential and applicative 
perspective.
To develop a disability laws attentive to the notion of person appears useful 
a narrative method inspired by the Law and Humanities [2, 10], a topical and 
rhetorical-argumentative methodology in the trial as an instrument of control of 
reasoning based on the adversarial principle [20, 40].
The methodology followed aims to promote the distinction between ‘repre-
sentation of the human situation’ and ‘legal analysis of the case’, without con-
fusing the planes but also without removing the ethical connection that is gen-
erated. It may be appropriate to represent the case narratively or by making a 
documentary that illustrates some of its specificities and explores the problem in 
its social dimension where possible, thus, solving it from a legal point of view. 
The two paths imply a ‘third’ position - between the documentary and narrative 
view and the legal - in a dialectic between relationship and distance that seems 
to indicate the sense of the difference between legal Thirdness and pure human 
sympathy.
Jacab, using the paradoxical sentence of the Czech novelist Capek, attributes 
the following methodological dilemma to legal education: “‘Every man should 
know something about everything and everything about something’. The question 
is whether there remains enough time to learn ‘everything about something’ if 
you have to learn ‘something about everything’” [32, p. 258].
This complex problem, to which the twofold use of the narrative or documen-
tary tools tries to respond, it not easily resolved. The documentary juxtaposition 
is necessarily humanistic and holistic; the legal one is more concentrated and 
restricted in providing a norm-based response to a case. The desired result is the 
connection of the two approaches, one  holistic, the other specific, in an inter-
pretation of national disability legislation inspired by the CRPD vision and the 
consequent education of a generation of lawyers able to understand the disabil-
ity issues on a methodological level. In the current context of disability law, the 
problematic point is the contrast between the two approaches that can be identi-
fied. The first is the holistic and unitary approach to the issue of disability, based 
on the concept of person, suggested by the UN Convention and its implement-
ing texts. The second approach, still prevalent today in Italian courts and public 
administration [51] is the one in which the legislation on disability is seen merely 
as rules whose enforcement must respect financial budget constraints. Therefore, 
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the second approach implicitly forgets the issue of justice related to the position 
of the disabled and the first approach suggested by the Convention.
6  The Rhetorical Method, Ethics, and Thirdness
The methodology proposed is helping to resolve the contrast between CRPD 
guiding principles and regional and national interpretative legal practices. Such 
a method aims at implementing a rhetorical method linked to a Thirdness theory 
in order to promote a new culture of disability law. Through a Thirdness theory, 
the law of disability conceived as a unitary figure and inspired by a rhetorical 
methodology can contribute to the theoretical evolution of the methodology of 
legal interpretation, thus not limiting itself to raising fundamental questions of 
philosophy of justice, such as a new theory of the concept of legal person. The 
rediscovery of the rhetorical method, therefore, could provide a transformation 
of legal reasoning capable of going beyond some aporia proper to the positivis-
tic conception of law. Moreover, the return of the rhetorical method may make 
it possible to understand the structural role of the fictio iuris technique in legal 
reasoning. A few final words can be spent on the relationship between ethics and 
rhetoric with the rhetorical structure of the Thirdness in the trial, in which the 
judge is third before the parties.
Kojève proposed the Thirdness theory [35] as a characteristic trait of the law 
as such, not only related to the judge’s work before the parties or the administra-
tion, following his reading of Hegel [57]. Today it can be re-read in the light of 
the problem of the concrete application of the CRPD rules.
Within the contemporary debate, the rhetorical and argumentative method is 
based on Perelman’s rediscovery of classical rhetoric, founded on ethical grounds. 
Perelman is part of the debate between the doctrine of natural law and legal pos-
itivism after the end of the Second World War and the Holocaust. He tried to 
escape the alternative between positivism and skepticism or ethical nihilism [17, 
p. 177]. According to Perelman, formalist legal positivists like Kelsen and Bobbio 
believe that legal reasoning is a logical inference (model of a logical syllogism) 
whose premises are the authoritative legal norms established by the legislator. 
Perelman, on ethical grounds, denounced the reductionist nature of legal justice 
after the Holocaust and World War II. He criticized the Cartesian method expel-
ling rhetoric from philosophical reasoning and recovered the persuasive argumen-
tation of classical rhetoric as a different form of contingent quasi-truth, analogous 
to empirical reasoning, useful to reintroduce a form of justice into legal reasoning 
[56]. After Perelman, however, the reflection on the truthful status of legal claims 
based on a rhetorical methodology into the trial was further explored. The judge’s 
Thirdness within the trial is related to the arguments of the parties in the contro-
versy playing a role in the composition of the judicial reasoning’s premises. The 
legal decision making could be regarded as a rhetorical dialogue ending with an 
argumentative syllogism, conceived as a dialectical and rhetorical form of reason-
ing by the judge as Third.
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However, Perelman’s position seems to be, methodologically anticipated with 
greater theoretical effectiveness by the Giambattista Vico’s legal rhetoric. Francis 
Mootz III notes: “Perelman is less vigorous in his critique of Cartesian rational-
ism than Vico, who argued against the incipient rationalism of the Western tradi-
tion by defending the priority of rhetoric and its connections to our imaginative 
capacities and the metaphoric structure of human understanding” [44, p. 383]. 
The legal clinics’ methodological aim is to resume a rhetorical methodology 
inspired by Giambattista Vico in the legal clinic of disability as a social philoso-
phy for public life. As Mooney points out, Vico’s interest in the vitality of public 
life assured by the rhetorical form of education was a central topic of his work 
[43]. For Vico’s philosophy, societies fall apart when wisdom and eloquence 
become disjoined and the distinction between the two cultures emerges [40, 70], 
favored on the one hand by Cartesian rationality, and on the other hand by rhe-
torical mannerism that dissociates narrative and truth. Again, Mooney on Vico:
“[...]  there was nothing Vico abhorred as a society of isolated individuals. 
Whether original brutishness or ultra-sophistication caused it made no difference: 
solitude of spirit was a cultural disease. He went so far at one point, in fact, as to 
suggest a kind of state curriculum and civil religion non unlike that of Rousseau. If 
Descartes’s passion was indubitability, and Hobbes’s was security, that of Vico was 
civitas, the well-functioning republic in which man acted as citizens” [43, p. 86].
The use of rhetorical methodology à la Vico  in the interpretation of the norms 
seems to share the same objective of inclusion of the disabled person in the society 
of the CPRD. However, it extends it to the whole society: proposing an overcom-
ing of the Hobbesian principle auctoritas non veritas facit legem, which inspires the 
contemporary legal positivism.
As already mentioned, the prevailing view held today by jurisprudence and public 
administration favors a reductionist interpretation of disability law based on mainly 
economic arguments concerning the need to safeguard the financial budget of the 
state. However, the demands for justice raised by disabled people or associations 
of the disabled cannot be disregarded. Undoubtedly, these problems relating to the 
economic balance sheet of the state must be considered, but within a logic of reor-
ganization of the structures which do not see the dominant interests protected. At the 
center of legal protection must be the position of the disabled person, and ideally of 
every citizen, considered as a potentially disabled person: overcoming any differ-
ence in position between the presumed ‘normal’ and the ‘disabled’ citizen.
Seen within the rhetorical method à la Vico and a theory of the legal Thirdness 
à la Kojève, this social and civic itinerary shows a social and public utility for the 
whole society, outlining the CPRD model as the primary instance for the solution of 
intercultural problems.
The limited role of the notion of living independently could be re-thought within 
a broader social and political framework linked to a new vision of the concept of 
‘legal person’. The objective of seeking a ‘Thirdness position’ between the political 
and the legal, inspired by the rhetorical method in the interpretation of the law, can, 
therefore, assume a role of introducing a perspective of reform of the entire legal 
system by reintroducing the issue of social justice as a political philosophy. The 
question of living independently suggests a humanistic goal for education already 
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hoped for by Nussbaum, but with a different philosophical model underlying and 
aimed at building a new theory of the Thirdness inspired by Vico [28, p. 113].
An interesting philosophical perspective on which to base such an approach is the 
rhetoric of reason proposed by the philosopher Jean Robelin [61]. Fichte inspires 
Robelin’s theory. He believed that university knowledge can play a civil and social 
role. The French philosopher articulates a theory of reason in which a socially con-
structed conception of the Thirdness as ‘we’ (political, communitarian) is opposed 
in a complex way to a figure of the Thirdness as the impersonal ‘it is’ (in French 
‘on’) legal and inaccessible, where reason is constituted as a public power in the gap 
between the “we” that presides over the interlocution of the various communities 
and the “it is” that embodies the impersonality of social relations out of all inauthen-
ticity: in the gap, therefore, between the impersonality of social relations and their 
inter-individuality.
I can consider the rhetorical method as a dialogical method of transformation of 
society based on disability as a matter of justice, reintroducing the notion of fictio 
iuris in the configuration of the legal concept of person starting from a reading of 
art. 19 CRPD. A founding method of disability law in which, beyond the mere num-
bers of economic calculation, space is given back to the ideal of the Thirdness as a 
form of adequate legal evaluation of the social interest, within a dynamic and evo-
lutionary conception of legal norms. The disability law as a new unitary discipline 
within the specialized legal discipline seems particularly suitable to develop this 
methodology precisely because, as repeatedly indicated, it analyses a phenomenon, 
disability, which is a relational, social, evolving phenomenon, dependent on the cul-
tural and social evolving conception of disability. Beyond the Thirdness of the judge 
and the public administration, even the ‘Thirdness’ perspective of university legal 
knowledge can perhaps lead to the identification of innovative interpretations that 
are both internal to national law and capable of accepting the radical provocation 
that the CRPD has posed as a challenge to existing interpretative practices [63, p. 
106, 29, p. 117].
The rhetorical method is aimed at persuading and, therefore, at building an audi-
ence that is culturally willing to change its view of reality. In this sense, the rhetori-
cal method represents an indispensable methodology for removing the prejudices of 
judges and public administrators in the exercise of their functions. In the case of the 
judge, the rhetorical method consists in preventing a formalistic interpretation of the 
norms in force, issued prior to the adoption of the CRPD. An example of this is the 
case of ‘Anna’ (a fictitious name) in which, in the first instance and in the appeal, the 
judge’s argument was aimed at granting a modest reduction in parking fees in the 
centre of the city of Turin, for owners of cars used only for the purpose of transport-
ing persons with disabilities to health care or work.
Only the highest level of appeal to the Court of Cassation made it possible to 
identify the discriminatory behavior inherent in that decision, allowing the reasoning 
underlying the judicial interpretation of the rule to be reformulated starting from the 
right to live independently, recognizing to ‘Anna’ the right to benefit from the mod-
est economic contribution for parking in all situations of a normal and independent 
life, thus implicitly recognizing her right ‘to go to the cinema’ like any other person 
[63]. Following this different narration and reconstruction of the legal fact, and the 
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pronouncement of the Court of Cassation, the city of Turin modified its resolution 
on parking for the disabled, implementing a different vision of the concept of living 
independently of the disabled.
The rhetorical method makes it possible to rearticulate the narrative of the fact in 
the process, allowing the judge to avoid forms of discrimination. The same method-
ology can be reconstructed in everyone’s relationship with the public administration, 
public opinion and newspapers, in everyday life. The goal of the rhetorical method 
is to build through argumentation and communication an audience willing to accept 
the cultural content that the revolution in practices imposed by the CRPD enforces, 
transforming culture from small changes observable in individual cases. With this 
end in mind, the rhetorical method emerges from the very way in which the notion 
of legal person developed, through the legal science coming from the use of the rhe-
torical technique of argumentation in the context of Roman and Medieval law [33]. 
At the same time, it is precisely the use of the rhetorical method that demonstrates 
how the very notion of legal personhood is now challenged in its complex recon-
struction, even in relation to man-made technological products such as new forms 
of artificial subjectivity like the robot, as indicated by the difficulty of conceptu-
ally understanding the field of social robotics and its relationship to human emotions 
[11]. The evolution of the notion of legal person and the history of the rhetorical 
method in the construction of its elaboration appears far from exhausted, in an arc 
that is delineated from its roots in Roman law to the future scenarios of robotics.
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